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Introduction 
 
 
Ensuring the Quality of Scientific Climate 
Policy Advice 
In an Increasingly Pragmatic Policy Environment, Advisors Should Take a 
Step away from Politics 
Oliver Geden 
The UN climate summit in Paris will bring about a new bottom-up type of agreement 
based on voluntary emissions reduction pledges by individual states. This marks the 
end of the top-down policy paradigm dominant for more than two decades. Scientific 
advisors should use the paradigm shift manifesting itself in UN negotiations as an 
opportunity to critically reassess their role in international climate policy. In the future, 
it will become even more difficult to present findings that are both politically viable 
and scientifically sound. In situations where these standards conflict, advisors and 
advisory bodies must resist both political pressures and incentives that undermine 
scientific integrity. 
 
There is a paradigm shift underway in 
international climate policy. The top-down 
approach to mitigating climate change that 
has guided policy since the adoption of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 is slowly 
being replaced by a bottom-up model. The 
focus is no longer on meeting a global cli-
mate stabilization target of 2 °Celsius or 
on establishing a legally binding carbon 
budget—contrary to the preferences of the 
European Union (EU), developing countries, 
environmental NGOs, and mainstream cli-
mate policy advisors. The negotiations on 
a global agreement that are set to be con-
cluded at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP21) to the UNFCCC in Paris 2015 will in-
stead focus on voluntary mitigation commit-
ments of individual states. It is already clear 
that the aggregated contributions will be 
nowhere near adequate to maintain the 2 °C 
target set at the 2010 UN climate summit. 
A major shift in a public policy para-
digm undoubtedly has consequences for 
the respective scientific community. Ideal-
ly, scientific expertise for policymakers 
should meet two—potentially conflicting—
standards at once: it should be scientifically 
sound and politically viable. Researchers 
have played a prominent role in global cli-
mate policy over the last 25 years. But in 
the current, increasingly pragmatic politi-
cal environment, governments are facing 
the fact that they are unable to back up 
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their self-defined targets with action, and 
this is calling the role of scientific policy 
advisors into question. If advisors and 
advisory bodies want to keep their close 
working relationship with the countries 
that are pioneers in international climate 
policy, they will have to provide more prag-
matic policy evaluations and recommenda-
tions. On the other hand, putting the focus 
on scientific integrity also means that 
advisors will have to carefully consider the 
long-term consistency of their recommen-
dations. If in doubt, scientists should keep 
more distance from the political process. 
Shifting policy paradigm 
Only months away from the most signifi-
cant climate summit to date—COP21 in 
Paris—a feeling of disenchantment has set 
in among policymakers, researchers, and 
the public at large. There has been some 
political progress, but it will not be enough 
to achieve the previously set climate policy 
targets. There is a fundamental shift taking 
place in the climate policy paradigm, in 
the way the core problem is defined and the 
ways potential solutions are derived—and 
vice versa. Today, the focus is no longer pri-
marily on the problem itself (“dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system”) but on the key actors in the 
political process. To prevent the repeated 
failures of climate summits from discredit-
ing the process itself, diplomats have es-
sentially stopped trying to work towards an 
overarching approach to mitigating climate 
change. It is no longer considered realistic 
to persuade all major emitters to commit 
to ambitious and legally binding emissions 
reductions through UN agreements (see 
SWP Comments 29/2015). The world’s largest 
polluters—particularly China and the US—
decide what they are willing to do on their 
own terms. Once their pledges on national 
emissions limits have been submitted, they 
will not engage in any further serious nego-
tiations, either before or at COP21. 
What we are observing here is the rise of 
a genuinely political mode of climate diplo-
macy, in which concepts of strict emissions 
limits and remaining carbon budgets are 
being pushed into the background. This 
new, actor-centered paradigm is not focused 
on long-term goals for climate stabilization, 
but on the possibilities and limits of the 
negotiation process. The focus is no longer 
on the environmentally desirable, but on 
the politically feasible. 
Almost no one wants to admit this open-
ly. Such an admission would not only signify 
the failure of the last 25 years of UN climate 
policy; it would also stand in direct contra-
diction to the 2 °C target. Climate diplomats 
and NGOs therefore discuss the bottom-up 
approach not as a break with the top-down 
paradigm, but rather as a pragmatic supple-
ment that accommodates the major emit-
ters while also creating a framework for 
the climate initiatives of sub-national actors 
such as large cities and corporations. Fur-
thermore, the top-down approach is widely 
presented as entailing little more than a 
strong UN role and the existence of legally 
binding reduction targets. But in contrast 
to widespread assumptions, what truly 
defines the top-down approach to mitigat-
ing climate change is not the chosen politi-
cal arena (the UN system) but the overarch-
ing policy goal (limiting global warming to 
2 °C or even 1.5 °C), from which all further 
steps are rigorously derived.  
The world of climate policy is in a transi-
tional phase. The top-down paradigm has 
still not been abandoned as a political ideal, 
but it is slowly being eroded and replaced 
by a more practical bottom-up approach. 
This is evident in the contradictory expec-
tations that surround COP21—even among 
countries, think tanks, and NGOs that are 
‘progressive’ on climate policy. In light of 
the slow negotiation progress, even reaching 
an agreement that involves all of the UN 
Member States will be seen as a historic 
success. Yet contrary to what was decided 
on at COP17 in Durban in 2011, COP21 in 
Paris will only try to “keep the 2 °C target 
within reach”. But to bring the world onto 
a 2 °C path, ”ratcheting-up mechanisms” 
would have to be adopted in Paris to allow 
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for a gradual increase in ambitions over 
subsequent years. Such mechanisms are 
part of many climate agreements—but they 
are almost never actually put into practice. 
Their main function is to conceal disap-
pointing negotiation outcomes and to keep 
hopes of more ambitious policies alive. 
Shifting scientific advice 
This political paradigm shift can be ex-
pected to have a particularly strong impact 
on the researchers who advise policymakers 
and who are often the public face of cli-
mate research. And indeed, such an effect is 
already being felt. But the two main camps 
of researchers providing scientific advice 
on climate policy—natural scientists and 
economists—are being affected in some-
what different ways. 
For natural scientists, the situation 
seems to look relatively good at first glance. 
The basic concept of anthropogenic climate 
change is now generally accepted world-
wide, despite the persistence of denial in 
countries like the US, UK, and Australia. For 
some time now, the central question in the 
global debate has not been whether climate 
change is happening, but how, to what ex-
tent, and at what rate. As a result, natural 
scientists are likely to feature less promi-
nently in advisory councils. This will even-
tually lead to a ”depoliticization” of their 
research, which will allow scientific un-
certainties to be discussed again in a more 
dispassionate way. 
But how will natural scientists react 
to the growing political pragmatism? If it 
becomes more obvious that international 
climate policy is not derived from a global 
stabilization target, prominent scientists 
will be forced to choose between two equally 
inconvenient options. They could vigorous-
ly defend their original concept of plan-
etary boundaries and global thresholds, 
which would be met with increasing dis-
satisfaction from politicians, policymakers, 
and public funding agencies. Or they could 
soften their stance on an exact threshold 
to ‘dangerous climate change’, perhaps by 
allowing for temporary temperature over-
shoots or even higher stabilization targets. 
But after two decades of scientists emphati-
cally stressing that a strict temperature limit 
is imperative, it would hardly seem credible 
for scientific policy advisors to now shift 
this threshold (see SWP Research Paper 5/2013). 
The situation is even more complicated 
for climate economists, whose importance 
has grown steadily since the Fourth Assess-
ment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. 
By developing models to calculate global 
emissions scenarios, economists have taken 
a position at the forefront of the climate 
debate. Correspondingly, during the work 
on IPCC AR5, it was in Working Group III 
(Mitigation) where the governments’ line-
by-line approval of the “Summary for 
Policymakers” proved most contentious. 
Policymakers entrust climate economists 
with the authority to say which measures 
should be taken to reach climate targets 
with minimized costs. Since global green-
house gas emissions have increased by 40 
percent since 1990, this essentially leaves 
economists with the uncomfortable task 
of saying which international climate objec-
tives are still feasible. 
A good example of the dilemma scien-
tific policy advisors are facing can be seen 
in the concept of the emissions budget. It 
starts from a stabilization target—usually 
the 2 °C limit set by the UN—that is used to 
calculate the maximum amount of green-
house gases that can be emitted worldwide. 
This construct, which is a centerpiece of 
IPCC AR5, is much more rigorous than tar-
gets like ‘global emissions reductions of 50 
percent by 2050’, and is intended to severe-
ly limit the options available to policy-
makers. The later the global emissions peak 
is reached, and the higher that peak is, the 
greater the subsequent annual reduction 
rates will have to be in order to stay within 
the remaining budget. 
But what if policymakers do not comply? 
What if emissions continue rising with no 
peak in sight? Again, scientific advisors face 
two equally unappealing options. They can 
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become either less relevant to policymakers 
or more pragmatic. Economists could stick 
to rigorous calculations and distance them-
selves from the policy process by declaring 
that it is no longer realistic within a 2 °C 
compatible carbon budget. But since fund-
ing agencies continue to generously reward 
policy optimism, and since the global cli-
mate community still tends to believe that 
abandoning the 2 °C target as unrealistic 
would lead to a sense of fatalism, most cli-
mate economists have thus far chosen a 
more pragmatic path. 
This has led to a paradoxical situation. 
With each year of increasing emissions, the 
assumptions economists make about the 
transformative capacity of the global econo-
my look more optimistic—and less plausible. 
While economic advisors once considered 
it common sense that the global emissions 
peak would have to be reached before 2020 
and that annual reduction rates of more 
than 3 percent were not feasible, now econo-
mists are revising these critical assumptions.  
This is clearly evident in the two most 
important scientific climate policy assess-
ments: the IPCC Working Group III reports, 
and the annual Emissions Gap Reports 
of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP). While IPCC AR4 stated that 
for a 2 °C scenario, emissions would have 
to peak by 2015 at the latest, IPCC AR5 
refers to 2030 emissions levels that are even 
higher than today’s and still compatible 
with a 2 °C target, albeit with annual reduc-
tion rates of just 6 percent. And while the 
first four UNEP reports focused solely on 
estimating the 2020 emissions gap—the 
constant difference between global emis-
sions levels compatible with a 2 °C target 
and the levels expected if UNFCCC pledges 
are implemented—the 2014 report intro-
duced additional reference points with gap 
calculations for 2025 and 2030, given the 
growing unlikelihood that the “emissions 
gap” can be closed by 2020 as originally in-
tended.  
In both cases, climate economists have 
managed to get around past ‘make-or-break’ 
points for the 2 °C target only by calculat-
ing in significant amounts of ‘negative 
emissions’—the removal of greenhouse 
gases from the atmosphere during the 
second half of this century. Most models 
assume this can be achieved using a com-
bination of approaches known as BECCS: 
bioenergy (which would require 500 mil-
lion hectares of land—1.5 times the size 
of India) plus carbon capture and storage, 
an unproven technology. This approach, 
which allows missed emissions reductions 
to be compensated for at a later stage (Fig. 
1), highlights climate economists’ political 
acumen. In national political arenas, it is 
common to factor in the option of debt 
when developing fiscal budgets. Negative 
emissions allow economists to considerably 
extend the carbon budget originally set 
by natural scientists. Both types of budgets 
work with the same net amount, but the 
economists’ gross carbon budgets often 
effectively double the remaining emissions 
quota, establishing ‘carbon debt’, to be paid 
back later in the century—at least that is 
the hope. 
Due to a growing uneasiness among cli-
mate scientists that this kind of calculation 
could eventually damage their reputations, 
some advisors are trying to put more dis-
tance between themselves and policymak-
ers. While many scientists consider the key 
assumptions of climate stabilization sce-
narios to be unrealistic, they usually do 
not say so publicly. Instead, there are an 
increasing number of articles in academic 
journals questioning basic assumptions of 
climate economics and, for instance, calling 
on policymakers to seriously consider the 
practical preconditions and consequences 
of BECCS. On the one hand, this makes 
perfect sense, since the 2 °C target adopted 
by the UN cannot be achieved any other 
way—at least not with an annual reduction 
in economic growth of only 0.06 percentage 
points, predicted and widely communi-
cated by the IPCC. On the other hand, the 
cautious questioning of negative emissions 
has come surprisingly late, considering that 
the concept has been part of official IPCC 
emissions scenarios for years. 
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Figure 1  
Carbon budget and negative emissions 
Source: Figure by author, based on UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2014. 
 
Unsurprisingly, policymakers have 
shown little inclination to discuss a poten-
tially controversial technology that would 
require an extra land use, which equates 
almost half of today’s arable land world-
wide. Decision makers are delighted to hear 
that despite 25 years of dramatically in-
creasing emissions, the 2 °C target is still 
theoretically within reach. But they leave it 
at that and ignore the fine print. What is 
more, the IPCC in particular has made it 
all too easy for them to do so given the 
enormous complexity of the issue—even 
in its summaries for policymakers. 
But there are also positive signs: IPCC 
AR5 Working Group III already shows evi-
dence of steps in this direction. Using a 
rather implicit strategy, their report largely 
avoids normative statements and tends to 
weigh the risks connected with the differ-
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ent policy paths against possible benefits. 
IPCC AR5 also rejects the task originally 
assigned to it by the UNFCCC: that of evalu-
ating the adequacy of a 2 °C target com-
pared to 1.5 °C. The IPCC simply turns the 
question back over to policymakers, saying 
that target setting is too dependent on value 
judgments. In taking this stance, the IPCC 
has theoretically opened up the way for 
weaker climate targets. At the same time, 
it is signaling to policymakers that in such 
a case, scientists will no longer be available 
to lend UN climate policy scientific legiti-
macy. Target setting is a genuinely political 
task, since science is not capable of making 
authoritative statements about appropriate 
levels of risk avoidance or intergenerational 
fairness. 
Scientific evidence and 
policy-making 
For the past two decades, there has been 
an increasing discrepancy between climate 
policy intentions and the reality of rising 
emissions. While some degree of noncha-
lance regarding inconsistencies in talk, 
decisions, and actions is part of everyday 
life for politicians and diplomats, this is 
an attitude that has put scientific policy 
advisors in a difficult position, and one that 
is creating a sense of growing unease among 
climate researchers. Yet the central theme 
of the climate policy narrative—and the one 
currently echoed by mainstream scientific 
advisors—has always remained the same: 
“Time is running out, but we can still make 
it if we start to act now”. This statement is 
incompatible with the principle of scien-
tific consistency. When scientific policy 
advisors fall back on this mantra, they are 
reaffirming their established working rela-
tionship with climate policy pioneers like 
the EU. But in doing so, they are also effec-
tively glossing over more than two decades 
of climate policy inaction. 
Today, even moderate progress in 
UNFCCC negotiations is generally viewed 
as more significant than achieving a global 
climate stabilization target. Scientific ad-
visors should use the paradigm shift mani-
festing itself in the Paris agreement as occa-
sion to critically reassess their role in inter-
national climate policy. In the years to come, 
the difficulty of offering expertise that is 
both politically viable and scientifically 
sound will only increase. In situations where 
these standards conflict, advisors and advi-
sory bodies must resist both political pres-
sures and incentives that undermine scien-
tific integrity. Scientific advisors should 
stick to their original findings and recom-
mendations even as politicians fail to heed 
them. Stating the scientifically obvious in 
clear and unambiguous terms will not win 
climate advisors any popularity prizes, but 
it will prevent the recipients of their advice 
from gaining a false sense of security about 
the achievability of the 2 °C target and the 
probable consequences of more than two 
decades of increasing emissions. 
The scientific community must defend 
its independence from outside interfer-
ence—from progressive government ad-
ministrations and NGOs attempting to win 
scientists over to their ‘just’ causes as much 
as from climate change deniers. Inviting 
non-scientific stakeholders from business, 
government, and civil society to play an 
active role in defining research agendas, 
as happens in European ‘transdisciplinary 
sustainability research’, must be reconsid-
ered. Only when climate policy advisors 
maintain a certain distance from policy-
making and politics will scientists have the 
freedom to confront decision makers with 
unorthodox ideas, assessments, and recom-
mendations.  
If in doubt, advisors should give prece-
dence to scientific evidence. If not, they will 
not only be risking their own reputations; 
they will also be jeopardizing climate re-
search itself due to the enormous public 
attention on the issue of climate change. 
Thus, the necessary debate on the quality of 
climate policy advice should not be limited 
to those scientists who act as policy advisors: 
ultimately, all researchers will be affected. 
In order to successfully undertake the 
critical self-examination that is needed, cli-
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mate scientists must gain a clearer and 
more realistic picture of their target 
audience. Up to now, natural scientists 
and economists have oriented their work 
around policymakers’ idealizing self-
depictions. But objective rationality and 
long-term consistency of action are more 
the exception than the rule. Everyday 
politics is often dominated not by “evi-
dence-based policy-making” but by the 
attempt at “policy-based evidence-making”. 
This is seen, for instance, in policymakers’ 
use of the IPCC reports mainly as a source 
of quotes with which to legitimize their 
preferences—a practice that the IPCC should 
in some cases confront directly. 
Climate researchers should strive to 
understand how the expertise they provide 
is actually being used in political institu-
tions. Furthermore, climate policy advisors 
should divest themselves of the notion that 
they have a special status, and instead align 
their expectations with the scientific advi-
sory practices established in other public 
policy domains such as development, health, 
or foreign and security policy. By doing 
both, they will inevitably come to the reali-
zation that complex political decisions are 
affected by numerous factors. Scientific 
evidence is just one of these, along with 
competing interests, path dependencies, 
values and sheer pragmatics. The best that 
scientists can hope for is therefore “evi-
dence-informed policy-making”. (Fig. 2) 
Climate policy advisors should resist the 
temptation to be political entrepreneurs 
peddling their advice, for example, by exag-
gerating how easy it is to transform the 
economy or deploy renewable technologies. 
It is by no means the task of advisors to 
spread optimism about the future achieve-
ments of climate policy. Instead, they should 
critically analyze the risks and benefits of 
political efforts and contribute empirically 
sound—and sometimes unwelcome—per-
spectives to the global climate policy dis-
course. 
For some time now, responsibility for 
successfully addressing the climate prob-
lem has rested in the hands of governments. 
Figure 2  
Evidence-based vs. evidence-informed 
policymaking 
Source: Figure by author, based on David Christian 
Rose, “Five Ways to Enhance the Impact of Climate 
Science”, Nature Climate Change 4 (2014): 522–24. 
Valuable scientific knowledge will remain 
an important factor going forward, but it 
will by no means be the decisive factor. To 
start taking effective action, politicians and 
policymakers already know more than 
enough. 
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